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INTRODUCTION
The repression that underpinned life in South Africa during apartheid is well known, as is the resistance to it (Monama I996). From racial oppression to torture and massacre to economic deprivation, the violence suffered by the masses was upheld on economic, political and judicial terms (Johns & Davis I991) . Following the transition to democracy, with the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as president in I994, South Africa was faced with the task of dealing with its past, as well as undertaking some action to deal with structural social injustice.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), heralded as the most ambitious and organised attempt to deal with crimes of a past regime through a concept of truth, came into force on 19 July I995.1 Emerging as a political strategy to acknowledge past suffering whilst discusses the difficulties faced by the Commission in accessing the truth of apartheid, and details how some truths, such as those from women, were underrepresented in the collection process. The TRC is demonstrated to have provided a partial truth, not only because of the Commission's limited mandate to examine 'gross human rights violations', but also as a result of the tactics and techniques of negotiation employed by those who gave evidence. With many perpetrators and beneficiaries of apartheid demonstrating a lack of responsibility for their actions, the question is raised of the potential of the TRC to effectively build a reconciliatory bridge between opposing groups in South Africa.
Alongside this debate on truth, the connected concerns of criminal justice and social justice have been negated. The dominant 'victim' response that places the rule of law as the means to obtain 'justice', that injuries can be assuaged through the courtroom, was displaced by the Commission. Any hope for criminal justice, by prosecuting and punishing individuals, was dashed both by the TRC's mandate and by subsequent judicial policy. Further, the social justice that underpinned the TRC philosophy has not been realised. The perpetrators of violence, and beneficiaries of apartheid, have had no obligation to make any substantive changes (Zehr 1997) , and neither the TRC nor the government have sufficiently challenged the structural inequalities which contextualised apartheid policies. Many areas and 'communities' in South Africa remain dislocated and characterised by poverty, lack of good housing, poor education, limited health services and unemployment.
In the trade-off between the 'perceived route to peace' and 'justice', the TRC risks achieving neither. The effects of this stance can already be felt, with a governmental reticence to provide reparations to those designated as 'victims', judicial disregard for the implementation of prosecutions for non-participating perpetrators, beneficiary dismissal of responsibility for apartheid, and limited developmental change at a societal level. Balanced against the problems such as crime, violence, unresolved land issues and impoverished 'communities' in South Africa, the TRC could be said to have failed in its objectives. This article argues that, alongside the quest for truth, the central issues of social and criminal justice cannot be neutralised; without a thorough attempt to tackle the fall-out from apartheid, the Commission process can only symbolically promote reconciliation.
THE POLITICS OF TRUTH
The desire to promote change in civil society and state mechanisms has led commissions, across the world, to question the nature of truth (Hayner I994 personal or narrative truth, is premised on a culmination of individuals' subjective stories to provide a multilayered set of experiences. The third, social or dialogue truth, is constructed through the debate and discussion of facts on a collective level. Finally, the fourth, healing and restorative truth, is truth that places given facts 'in context' in an attempt to acknowledge individual experiences.
These overlapping notions, exemplifying the subjective truth of individual stories alongside objective fact-finding and debate, informed the workings of the TRC. On one level, the notions can be viewed as problematic. The standard of evidence available to the Commission, given that 'truth' was predominantly drawn from individualised points of view, has been called in question. Yet, 'in the end', the process will be 'judged a success', by its arrival at 'acceptable truths' (Henderson 2000: 464). To this end, the Commission promoted truth as a concept for everyone. Following years of state denial in the aftermath of human rights violations (Cohen I995), the TRC attempted to expose hidden stories and create a new 'truth', one that was made and owned by the people notfor the people.
Indeed, the number of people who participated in the creation of this new South African truth was unexpected. With over 21,000 victim statements and more than 7,000 amnesty applications, Yasmin Sooka, a TRC Commissioner, stated (in interview with author, Johannesburg,
4.2.I998)
that the extent and nature of violations had been inconceivable. She added:
There have been different levels of self-deception, from those saying they didn't know these things were happening at all to those that say 'these things were kept away from us'. A lot of people did not know that killings, torture, abduction and ill-treatment were happening on that scale. Even those that worked within the movement have an acute sense of shock that it was so gross, they did not know the extent to which violence had descended. This attempt to acknowledge personal narratives, in an effort to 'undo power' (Breytenbach I994) and challenge historical perceptions, has ensured that the TRC has retained a certain degree of legitimacy with the South African people. Yet, the Commission, undertaking most of its work under the public gaze, has also been in a position subject to much scrutiny and criticism ( Ironically, with the awareness that the South African government is currently unwilling to adequately fulfil rights of reparation or to implement procedures for prosecution (detailed below), it could be argued that these forms of censorship may have been avoided. With hindsight, such political decisions to frame stories were not required, given the lack of ensuing actions these limitations on truth were unnecessary.
Notwithstanding
Politicians and business personnel have also embraced the political benefits of 'making truth fit'. As such, powerful individuals, using their We have a nation of victims and if we are unable to provide complete justice on an individual basis ... it is possible for us through this process and the way we reconstruct our society, to ensure that there is ... collective justice for the people of our country. If we achieve that, if we bring about social justice ... then those who today feel aggrieved in that individual justice has not been done will at least be able to say that our society has achieved what the victims fought for. Yet, with no real change in social conditions and no clear attempt to address perceptions of injustice and exclusion amongst certain groups, the TRC has lost its impact. The Centre for Conflict Resolution in Rondebosch has argued that there should be an impetus for a process to deal with the basic need for subsistence (Bauman I997). If there is to be any opportunity for resolution of past and current conflict, socioeconomic conditions require reconstruction to provide some form of social justice (Kinghorn 199I For many, this opportunity to present the different layers of truth will have to suffice. While the Commission has provided a springboard for future action by ensuring that South Africa's past cannot be denied, its limitations need to be made clear. Despite its detail, the TRC Report is not the definitive history of South Africa. Further, even though the Report is nearly one million words long and demonstrates a wealth of human experience and historical accountability, it cannot dissolve years of conflict and power struggles on its own, overnight. It cannot command reconciliation.
Operating alongside dismissals of responsibility for apartheid, and a displacement of the historical roots of conflict, the potential of the Commission to build a 'reconciliatory bridge' is brought into question. In hindsight, the TRC, grafted onto the structural context of apartheid, stood little chance of making substantive change. The negation of criminal and social justice that characterised apartheid has been upheld by the new ruling powers. Placed alongside continued inequality and discrimination, truth appears of little value.
